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Of Epistemic Tools: musical instruments
as cognitive extensions
THOR MAGNUSSON
ixi audio, Music Informatics Research Lab, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, BN1 9RH Brighton
E-mail: thor@ixi-audio.net
This paper explores the differences in the design and
performance of acoustic and new digital musical instruments,
arguing that with the latter there is an increased
encapsulation of musical theory. The point of departure is the
phenomenology of musical instruments, which leads to the
exploration of designed artefacts as extensions of human
cognition – as scaffolding onto which we delegate parts of our
cognitive processes. The paper succinctly emphasises the
pronounced epistemic dimension of digital instruments when
compared to acoustic instruments. Through the analysis of
material epistemologies it is possible to describe the digital
instrument as an epistemic tool: a designed tool with such a
high degree of symbolic pertinence that it becomes a system
of knowledge and thinking in its own terms. In conclusion, the
paper rounds up the phenomenological and epistemological
arguments, and points at issues in the design of digital
musical instruments that are germane due to their strong
aesthetic implications for musical culture.
1. INTRODUCTION
The philosopher Don Ihde is well known for his
analysis of how we establish a relationship with the
world through tool use (Ihde 1979, 1990). Ihde reports
on various phenomenological modalities in our rela-
tionship with tools, two of which are relevant to this
article. For Ihde, the acoustic musical instrument is an
illustrative example of a technology that enables an
embodiment relationship to the world. The instrument
becomes an extension of the body, where trained
musicians are able to express themselves through
incorporated knowledge that is primarily non-
conceptual and tacit. The other phenomenological
mode, the hermeneutic relationship, differs in the sense
that here the instrument is not an extension of the
body, but rather a tool external to the body whose
information we have to interpret (thus hermeneutic).
This instrument can be seen as a text, something we
have to read in our use of it. Disregarding the perils of
dualism, and acknowledging that these distinct rela-
tionships can overlap in the same musical instrument,
I would like to propose that many digital instruments
are to be seen primarily as extensions of the mind
rather than the body. This seemingly dichotomous
statement will be explored in section 3 below.
Furthermore, and in relation to the above, I will
argue that while acoustic instruments afford a strong
embodiment relationship with the world (or the
terminus of our activities – the physical energy of
sound), digital instruments increasingly tend to con-
strue us in a hermeneutic relationship with the world.
The tangible user interfaces that apparently constitute
many digital musical instruments are but arbitrary
peripherals of the instruments’ core – that is, a core
that is essentially a symbolic system of computational
design. I contend that the primary body of the digital
instrument is that of symbolic instructions written
for the meta-machine, the computer. As opposed to
the body of the acoustic instrument, the digital
instrument does not resonate; it contains few latent
mysteries, or hidden expressive potential that typi-
cally can be derived from the materiality of acoustic
instruments (Edens 2005). The functionality of the
digital instrument is always explicitly designed and
determined. Indeed, the digital musical instrument –
especially if it makes use of automation or other
mappings that are not one-to-one gesture-to-sound –
is constituted by generic, prescriptive and normative
sets of rules that affect or direct the musician at the
high level of musical language (both formal and
theoretical).
The focus of this paper are novel digital musical
interfaces, in particular those to be found in a
research field best represented by the NIME (New
Interfaces for Musical Expression) conference series.
Although relevant as well, the analysis is not directed
at digital pianos or pure studio simulators like Pro-
Tools. What is of interest are the computational
music systems used to build expressive intelligent
instruments, or composed instruments (Schnell and
Battier 2002), where the distinction often blurs
between instrument and composition on the one
hand, and performance and composition on the
other. Composed instruments typically contain auto-
mation of musical patterns (whether blind or intelli-
gent) that allow the performer to delegate musical
actions to the instrument itself, such as playing
arpeggios, generating rhythms, expressing spatial
dimensions as scales (as opposed to pitches), and so
on. These systems are therefore split systems between
the physical interface and the programmed sound
engine. Typically such engines are programmed in
environments like Pure Data, SuperCollider, ChucK,
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Max/MSP or Kyma. These tools have such advanced
algorithmic capabilities that there is no need to limit
the instrument to direct one-to-one gesture-to-sound
mapping; the instrument can implement various
complex (and even adaptive) mapping structures and
contain various degrees of automation from simple
looping to complex artificial intelligence responses.
All these computational techniques are impossible in
acoustic instruments and their theoretical implica-
tions unavoidably involve an explicit systemic repre-
sentation of music as a rule-based field or a creative
search space (Boden 1990).
I will define the computational music system as an
epistemic tool, as an instrument (organon) whose
design, practice and often use are primarily sym-
bolic.1 The concept of epistemic tools is not intended
to define exclusively digital technologies; it includes
all tools that work as props for symbolic offloading
in our cognitive process. Good examples of symbolic
but analogue machines are the abacus and the astro-
labe. In order to clarify this point, this paper proceeds
to explore the nature of embodiment as a non-
representational or non-symbolic process. It then
looks at how human cognition can make use of
material supports outside the body, echoing Andy
Clark’s statement that cognitive processes can ‘extend
outside the head of an individual’ (Clark 1996: 81).
The central question then becomes what it means
when music is composed and performed with intelli-
gent artefacts that are inscribed with a specific music
theoretical outlook.
The question of epistemic tools can be posed like
this: if much of our thinking happens ‘in the wild’
(Hutchins 1995), external to our body, as a socio-
cultural process that uses technology as an external
scaffolding of cognitive processes, and if our learning is
largely a process of incorporating knowledge in a non-
symbolic way through an enactive relationship with
our tools and environment; how do computers, as
necessarily symbolic devices, enable, produce, main-
tain, support, augment but also constrain and limit our
cognitive processes and therefore creative output?
The aim of this paper is to identify two linked
distinctions that are becoming increasingly apparent
in the design and analysis of modern musical instru-
ments. Firstly, it examines the different embodied
experiences available in acoustic and digital in-
struments (which is primarily a phenomenological
investigation); this route has been navigated most
often in the NIME community. Secondly, it explores
the disparate theoretic and material affordances of
acoustic and digital instruments (here seen as an
epistemological enquiry); whilst related to and con-
straining the first area, previous work has largely
neglected this perspective. This paper therefore seeks
to correct the imbalance between the two identified
distinctions in the analysis of digital musical instru-
ments by addressing the epistemological nature of
our new musical instruments.
2. THE MASTERY OF A MUSICAL
INSTRUMENT: A SUB-SYMBOLIC SKILL
ACQUISITION
Twentieth-century cognitivism has not been successful
in portraying human intelligence, and various
approaches have emerged that propose different views
of cognition where typically the body and the environ-
ment enter the equation.2 One of the most musically
relevant approaches is enactivism, as developed by
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991). This theory, with
roots in biology but inspired by phenomenology and
Eastern thought, depicts the mind as necessarily
embodied in an external environment. In enactivism
there is no distinction between perception and action;
both co-emerge through the agent’s active involvement
with the world. This involvement is primarily non-
representational – in other words, it is at a level where
the cognition is subconscious, pre-conceptual, dis-
tributive and emergent. Varela et al. define the term:
We propose the term enactive to emphasize the growing
conviction that cognition is not the representation of a
pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the
1As an example we might take Michel Waisvisz’s The Hands
instrument. Every sensor of the complex interface is mapped to a
specific parameter in the software-based sound engine. A change in
the engine will result in a new (or altered) instrument. Although the
interface has not been altered by a change in the mapping algo-
rithm, the instrument behaves differently. For Waisvisz, changing
the algorithms that constitute the sound engine means learning a
new instrument, which involves the re-incorporation of the con-
ceptual understanding of the engine’s functionality into bodily
memory (Waisvisz 1999, 2005).
2Cognitivism is here used as a term that denotes the trend in cog-
nitive science from the mid twentieth century to view human cog-
nition as primarily symbolic. This resulted in a tradition in
Artificial Intelligence now called GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned
AI). Arguably, the distinct fields of cognitive science and computer
technology symbiotically constituted each other’s rise through this
period. The new theories criticising cognitivism include: Con-
nectionism, where the idea is to build artificial neural networks that
perform cognitive tasks through non-representational content
(McClelland, Rumelhart and the PDP Research Group 1986);
Enactivism, which claims that the whole body and the environment
becomes part of the cognitive function (Varela et al. 1991);
Dynamic Systems, a non-representational theory claiming that
cognition (and consciousness) arises as epi-phenomena of the
process of being in the world (Brooks 1991); Situated Cognition, a
theory of knowledge acquisition as situated, being in part a product
of the activity, context and culture in which it is developed and
used (Brown et al. 1989); Situated Action, an emphasis on the
constitutional context of all action as emergence (Suchman 1987);
Activity Theory, where the focus is on human tool use and the
cultural and technological mediation of human activity (Bertelsen
and Bødker 2003); Embodied Cognition, where thinking and acting
is seen as one process, emphasising our situatedness, and claiming
that our cognitive system emerges from interaction with the world
(Anderson 2003); and Distributed Cognition, where cognition is
seen as an interaction between human and artefacts, and emphasis
is laid on the social nature of human existence (Hutchins 1995).
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enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a
history of the variety of actions that a being in the world
performs. (Varela et al. 1991: 9)
Importantly, this does not mean that humans are
not symbolic cognisers. That fact is obvious by
looking at how humans constantly create and use
symbolic systems such as language, mathematics and
music, or games such as chess. Stressing that they ‘see
symbols as a higher-level description of properties
that are ultimately embedded in an underlying dis-
tributed system’ (Varela et al. 1991: 101), Varela et al.
find it more appropriate to define symbols (or cog-
nitive representations) as ‘approximate macrolevel
descriptions of operations whose governing principles
reside at a subsymbolic level’ (Varela et al. 1991: 102).
Varela et al. describe embodiment as an enactive
stance towards the world where we create our (not ‘the’)
world through an active engagement with it. Enactivism
is resourceful in explanations of embodiment, some-
thing we should bear in mind when analysing how
acoustic musicians incorporate knowledge of their
instruments through repeated practice. It also explains
how symbolic systems are higher-level descriptions of
phenomena understood by the agent through bodily
perceptions. There is a general consensus in cognitive
science that musicians (or athletes for that matter) learn
their skills gradually through persistent practice and a
minimum of verbal instructions (Dreyfus and Dreyfus
1986). Such bodily incorporation transforms our tools
into ready-at-hand phenomena (Heidegger 1962) that
are not based on symbolic or theoretical relations any
more. The focus becomes the act and not the object, or,
as Winograd and Flores explain in a Heideggerian
manner, ‘[m]y ability to act comes from my familiarity
with hammering, not my knowledge of a hammer’
(Winograd and Flores 1986: 33).
According to the enactive view, the skill acquisition
related to learning an acoustic instrument is highly
embodied, non-symbolic and perceptuo-motor
based.3 It explains how Ihde’s ‘embodiment relations’
to the world are established, and provides a descrip-
tion of this process of incorporation4 from the level of
biology. An important research question here
becomes to explore, together with the enquiry into
the epistemological or music theoretical nature of
digital tools, how the digital musical instrument
manifests a different relationship between the human
body and the body of the instrument itself through its
characteristic split between the interface and the
sound engine.
3. THE EXTENDED MIND
In the 1990s, working in another strand of cognitive
science from that of Varela et al., Andy Clark
developed his theory of the ‘extended mind’. Clark
illustrates how people use props in the environment
to extend their cognitive capacity and ease cognitive
load. Sticky notes, notebooks, diagrams, models, and
so on all serve as scaffoldings onto which we ‘offload’
our cognition. It should be noted that this is not some
kind of mystical panpsychism, as Clark and Chalmers
adamantly point out that they do not equate the
cognitive process with consciousness (Clark and
Chalmers 1998). The cognitive process happens both
inside and outside the skull, an observation reminis-
cent of Wittgenstein’s account of thinking as physical
activity (Wittgenstein 1969: 6).
[In certain conditions, t]he human organism is linked
with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating
a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in
its own right. All the components in the system play an
active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in
the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we
remove the external component the system’s behavioral
competence will drop, just as it would if we removed
part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled
process counts equally well as a cognitive process,
whether or not it is wholly in the head. (Clark and
Chalmers 1998: 7)
Objects and artefacts serve as an external playground
for thinking. We calculate on paper, draw graphs,
build models, make reminders of all kinds, and, as
Clark illustrates, we reorganise the pieces when
playing Scrabble. According to this view, it does not
matter whether information is stored and processed
in the brain or outside in the environment, what
matters is how the data is retrieved and taken into use
(Clark 2003).
While the theory of extended mind has much
potential for interesting discussions in cognitive sci-
ence, it is pertinent, in the context of musical tech-
nology, to probe deeper. Indeed, the picture is more
intricate since we are surrounded by objects and
technologies (or ‘thrown’ into world of equipment as
Heidegger would describe it) that contain complex
material properties, scripts of their usage (Latour
1994), and even politics (Winner 1980). The objects
around us – the technologies that serve as props in
our thinking and music making – are stuffed with
people and their ideas; in them we find programmes
of action, manuals of behaviour, and political and
sociocultural constructions, including aesthetic ten-
dencies. Technological objects are therefore never
neutral, they contain scripts that we subscribe to or
reject according to our ideological constitution. The
problem is that the scripts are often well hidden and
concealed, which can result in an uncritical use of
3Useful accounts of the non-symbolic nature of learning are David
Sudnow’s ethnographic account of learning to play the jazz piano
(Sudnow 2001) or Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ analysis of the five stages
of skill acquisition (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986).
4On the process of incorporation in the context of embodiment, see
Hayles (1999).
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creative technologies – technologies inherent with
ideological content.
To illustrate this point in the field of musical
instruments, we see that the piano keyboard ‘tells us’
that microtonality is of little importance (and much
Western music theory has wholly subscribed to that
script); the drum-sequencer that 4/4 rhythms and
semiquavers are more natural than other types; and
the digital audio workstation, through its affordances
of copying, pasting and looping, assures us that it
is perfectly normal to repeat the same short perfor-
mance over and over in the same track. It is therefore
germane to ask ourselves how much theory is
inscribed into our new tools, particularly with regard
to how automated, structurally complex and aiding
(in composition and performance) our new musical
instruments have become.
4. MATERIAL EPISTEMOLOGIES
Things are impregnated with thoughts; they are
embedded with ideologies that have ethical, political
and aesthetical implications. Furthermore, we use
those artefacts in our daily tasks as extensions of our
cognitive mechanism. But how do things ‘contain’
knowledge? How do we write our knowledge into
artefacts, and how do we read that knowledge from
them? By the same token, how does this relate to
digital musical instruments?
Davis Baird (2004) shows how material objects can
have a different epistemological status to statements
of language. Technological objects may contain
functions which their users understand, but would
not be able to describe in language as ‘[t]he material
products are constitutive of scientific knowledge in a
manner different from theory, and not simply
‘‘instrumental to’’ theory’ (Baird 2004: 1). Much like
Heidegger and Ihde, Baird shows that technological
objects can precede science, and afford scientific dis-
coveries through their physical structure and func-
tionality. The point here is not what precedes what,
but rather that the instrument becomes an expression
in itself, an externalisation of knowledge in a form
that is not symbolic but material. Additionally, it is
not only designed objects that inhere knowledge, but
natural objects as well, by means of the physical and
mechanistic properties of their material.
Knowledge can be expressed in many ways. Theories
express knowledge through the descriptive and argu-
mentative functions of language. Instruments express
knowledge both through the representational possibi-
lities that materials offer and through the instrumental
functions they deploy. (Baird 2004: 131)
Baird is well aware of Bruno Latour’s ideas of
concretisation: namely, that when many elements
combine into one actor and start to operate as a unity
(with either human or non-human agency), they
gradually become a black box. When the black box
works, its origins are forgotten and thus ‘para-
doxically, the more science and technology succeed,
the more opaque and obscure they become’ (Latour
1999: 304). Baird agrees with Latour on the nature of
scientific blackboxing, but highlights another and
perhaps more epistemologically active function of the
black box itself: while talking about a particular
instrument, called Spectromet, Baird says
[t]he knowledge used in this context is tacit in the sense
that those using the instrument (typically) could not
articulate the understanding of spectrochemestry they
deploy in doing so. Nonetheless, they can use it. This
spectrochemical knowledge has become detached. It has
gone inside – inside the instrument – and can now tacitly
serve other technical and scientific purposes. (Baird
2004: 163)
Here (and spectacularly exemplified in the digital
musical system) we see how the blackboxed instrument
contains the knowledge of its inventors, which means
that the users of the instrument do not need to have a
deep knowledge of its internal functions. If we assume
that both the designers and the users of the instrument
have an understanding of it, this understanding is very
different and attained from distinct origins. The for-
mer creates the instrument from a conceptual under-
standing of the domain encapsulated by it, whereas
the latter gains operational knowledge that emerges
through use (or habituation) and not from abstract
understanding of the internal functionality. This pic-
ture is particularly complex in today’s new musical
interfaces as typically their designers are also the per-
formers. This implies a continuous oscillation between
a mode of conceptual (system design) engagement with
the instrument and embodied (performative) relation-
ship with it. Again, we are reminded of Waisvisz’s
stance introduced above, where we might talk of two
modes: that of the instrument designer and the
instrument player.
5. THE ACOUSTIC, THE ELECTRIC
AND THE DIGITAL: INTERFACES OF
A DIFFERENT KIND
When the technological artefact is made of material
substrata (as opposed to symbolic), it can contain
knowledge that precedes the scientific understanding
of its functioning. The acoustic instrument is a good
example. The sophisticated sound of the clarinet or
the cello was developed over an extended period of
time, but this sound was mature long before Fourier
or Helmholtz brought forth their theories of sinu-
soidal functions and timbre. Strings, wood and brass
tacitly encompass the theories of sound in their
materiality. The observation here is that acoustic
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instruments inhere knowledge that has to be explicitly
understood and stated in the design of digital
instruments; without this explicit knowledge no code
could ever be written. We explore and discover the
sonic properties of wood and strings, but a solid
theoretical knowledge of sound is required in order to
create digital musical systems.
Let us briefly explore some main differences in the
design of acoustic, electric and digital instruments.
The acoustic instrument builders will acquire their
skills through the embodied practice of making the
instruments. These skills, including the intuition of
material properties and sound physics, are largely in
the form of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966) acquired
through apprenticeship. It is a predominantly em-
bodied and non-theoretical knowledge derived from
discovery, exploration and refinement. The develop-
ment of the acoustic instrument involves iterations
of designing, building and testing. The instrument
makers work with what physical materials afford in
terms of acoustics; a change in curve, in width, or in
material means a change in sonic timbre. The inter-
face is necessarily conditioned by the properties of the
materials used, and various solutions are therefore
introduced to adapt to or extend the scope of the
human body with the use of levers, keys and other
mechanisms. Acoustic instruments are therefore
firmly grounded and conditioned by human physique
in their design.
The makers of electronic instruments, such as the
early synthesisers, work with different materials. In-
stead of millennia of tradition, they start with explor-
ing the material properties of electricity, magnetic
waves, oscillators, capacitors, inductors and transistors.
As with the acoustic instrument, the creative process is
one of designing, building and testing through a cycle of
iterations, actively working with the materials. How-
ever, the materials of the electronic instrument makers
come with instructions and schematic diagrams that
describe their behaviour. There is an increased logic of
calculation, science and engineering. Fourier’s and
Helmholtz’ theories are now well known, and the
instrument makers can draw from that knowledge in
their designs of oscillators and filters. However, some of
the characteristic sound in electronic instruments
depends on the chaotic or entropic properties of the
materials used.5 The user interfaces in electronic musi-
cal instruments can be built in any shape and form. In
terms of ergonomics, we are still constrained by physi-
cal mapping, so when the instrument has been wired
up, its fundamental functionality is not easily changed.
This gives the machine an instrumental quality, a
character that affords in-depth explorations.
The digital instrumentmakers are in a different world
altogether. The ‘workshop’ is the meta-machine of the
computer, and inspecting them at work might not
suggest any associations with musical activities.6 Code
as material is not musical; it does not vibrate; it is
merely a set of instructions turned into binary infor-
mation converted to an analogue electronic current in
the computer’s soundcard. The materials of the digital
instrument are many: a computer, a monitor, a sound
card, an amplifier, speakers, and tangible user inter-
faces. Behind this material surface lie other materials:
audio programming languages, digital signal proces-
sing, operating systems, mapping mechanisms between
gestures and sound engines, and so on. From the per-
spective of Latour’s actor-network theory, the net-
works enrolled in the production of digital instruments
are practically infinite. There is an impenetrable
increase in complexity, which means that the inventors
have to constantly rely on black boxes. Furthermore,
the materials used in the digital instrument originate
from technoscientific knowledge. There are relatively
few physical material properties at play (although of
course at the machine level we find matter) compared
to the amount of code that constitutes its internal (and
symbolic) machinery. The inventors have knowledge
about digital signal processing, sound physics, audio
synthesis, gesture recognition, human–machine inter-
action, and the culture of musical performance. In
general, the digital instrument is based on the knowl-
edge of symbolic systems and their essence in the form
of code. From a design perspective, any interface can
be designed for any sound. There is no natural map-
ping between gesture and sound in digital systems. In
acoustic instruments the performer yields physical
force to drive the instrument, whereas in electric
instruments there can be mixture of both physical and
electric force. In digital instruments, the physical
force becomes virtual force; it can be mapped from
force-sensitive input devices to parameters in the
sound engine, but that mapping is always arbitrary
(and on a continuous scale of complexity), as
opposed to what happens in physical mechanisms.
Therefore, from the perspective of embodiment
relations, there is a characteristic diversity in the way we
work with the materials that constitute our musical
instruments. Digital music systems, whose foundations
are essentially of a symbolic nature, are more likely to
establish hermeneutic relations to the world than
acoustic instruments, where understanding of expressive
5A good example is how the oscillators in the Moog synthesisers
detune, resulting in a full and pleasant chorus-like sound. In later
synthesisers, like the ARP, it was discovered that by placing the
oscillators on the same material, next to each other, they would
have the same temperature and therefore not go out of tune as
much as in the Moog (Pinch and Trocco 2002).
6There might not be any keyboards, notes or indeed sounds in the
air – a fact that apparently prompted Bob Moog to attach a key-
board to his analogue synths, as, when he was photographed in his
studio, people would be more likely to relate this new technology of
knobs and wires to music (Pinch and Trocco 2002).
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affordances are incorporated into the performer’s
motor memory. To work with symbolic tools means
that one has to continually switch modes from
focusing on the world to focusing on the tool with
regular intervals and to a more pronounced degree
than in acoustic instruments. This detachment from
the terminus of our activities could be paraphrased as
a disruption in flow and is present in the majority of
existing digital music systems.
6. EPISTEMIC TOOLS
Anyone who speaks more than one language, in parti-
cular if those languages are of different linguistic
families, knows how differently each language por-
trays the world. A language is a world-view. This
observation is the basis of a theory called the Sapir–
Whorf hypothesis, which states that different lan-
guages portray both space and time differently.7 The
Sapir–Whorf hypothesis claims that grammatical
categories of the language determine the speaker’s
behaviour: ‘We cut nature up, organize it into con-
cepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely
because we are parties to an agreement to organize it
in this way – an agreement that holds throughout our
speech community and is codified in the patterns of
our language’ (Whorf 1956: 213). Seventy years earlier,
Nietzsche had argued that physics were an inter-
pretation of the world and not its explanation. The
sciences reject phenomenological experience in favour
of objective language and they ‘do this by means of the
pale, cool, gray, conceptual nets which they threw over
the colourful confusion of sense, the rabble of the
senses’ (Nietzsche 2004: y14). Rather more recently,
Bowker and Star (2000) have argued that there are
certain problems in the design of computer systems
that relate to the act of classification. When we classify
and categorise our external world, in order to repre-
sent it through the machinery of information tech-
nology, we are inevitably performing acts of reduction.
Such reductions are bound to be contingent and
messy, with abundance of ethical and political impli-
cations. Human actions are displaced into repre-
sentation, thus establishing strata of complexities and
interdependencies that limit the agent.
This nature of categorisation and abstraction of
human knowledge (both know-that and know-how)
and actions is the essence of computer software, a
fact that is vividly apparent in the realm of musical
software tools. Software is, as Bowker and Star point
out, a ‘contingent’ and ‘messy’ classification that has
diverse implications and, in our case, aesthetic, cul-
tural and culture-political effects. As Latour (1987) so
elegantly demonstrates, objects establish themselves
as black boxes through repeated use, and in that
process their origins disappear. The object is natur-
alised8 through heavy use, a fact that makes Bowker
and Star observe that ‘[t]he more naturalized the
object becomes, the more unquestioning the rela-
tionship of the community to it; the more invisible the
contingent and historical circumstances of its birth,
the more it sinks into the community’s routinely
forgotten memory’ (Bowker and Star 2000: 299).
Writing digital musical interfaces therefore neces-
sarily entails the encapsulation of a specific musical
outlook. It is a (sub-)culturally conditioned system-
atisation of musical material. Musical patterns,
musical styles and musical aesthetics become black-
boxed in software. Most people do not know why the
standards, implementations, patterns or solutions in
musical software are there. At times, they manifestly
limit the musical expression, but at other times lim-
itations are concealed by the rhetoric, streamlined
functionality and slick interface design of the soft-
ware tool. Here we encounter yet another difference
between the worlds of acoustic and digital instrument
making. The acoustic instrument maker can freely re-
invent or improve the instrument at any time with
new materials, changing structures or adding/deleting
features (Eldredge and Temkin 2007). The software
instrument maker is limited by the complex infra-
structure of operating systems, programming lan-
guages, protocols and interface limitations. In digital
instruments, systems of classification form an orga-
nisation of musical language, a clarification and
explicit elucidation of the musical language and its
rules. However, and well known since Wittgenstein’s
later writings, languages are not easily formalised as
systems. At the core of all languages are dynamic,
emergent and adaptive sets of rules that change
through time and differ in geographical locations or
in sub-cultures. The act of formalising is therefore
always an act of fossilisation. As opposed to the
acoustic instrument maker, the designer of the com-
posed digital instrument frames affordances through
symbolic design, thereby creating a snapshot of
musical theory, freezing musical culture in time. The
digital instrument is thus more likely to contain an
expressive closure as contrasted with the explorative
openings of the acoustic instrument.
From our analysis of the epistemic tools, we can
now crudely generalise (and therefore exaggerate for
the sake of an argument) a core difference between
the acoustic and the digital. The acoustic instrument is
material and developed from bottom-up exploration
of the acoustic properties of the materials used. Here,
the sound generation (and the required knowledge
7This hypothesis has many followers and critics. A notable criticism
was voiced by Stephen Pinker (1994), who, in a Chomskyan
manner, argues for a universal underlying structure of language. 8Or ‘concretisised’ or ‘pointilised’ in actor-network theory lingo.
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of it) is given to us for free by nature. We had com-
plex instruments in the form of lutes, flutes and
organs long before we ever had a mathematical
understanding of sound. The physics of wood, strings
and vibrating membranes were there to be explored
and not invented. However, using the acoustic
instrument we develop an intuitive understanding of
the instrument, the music theory, and the tradition in
which we are playing. As the interaction with the
instrument is primarily embodied, we have to train our
body to be in rhythm with the instrument – in other
words to incorporate the musical knowledge in sync (or
mutual resonance) with the particular instrument of
choice. As opposed to the generic explicitness of the
digital instrument, the acoustic instrument contains a
boundless scope for exploration as its material char-
acter contains a myriad ways for instrumental entropy,
or ‘chaotic’, non-linear behaviour that cannot be
mapped and often differs even in the same type
(brand and model) of instruments.
The digital instrument is theoretical and developed
from a largely top-down methodology. In order to
make the instrument, we need to know precisely the
programming language, the DSP theory, the synthesis
theory, generative algorithms and musical theory, and
have a good knowledge of Human Computer Interac-
tion. To use the instrument, on the other hand, we learn
the tool through working with it and habituate our-
selves with its functions, progressively building an
understanding of its workings. As users we often do not
need to know as much about synthesis or music theory,
as the black box is intended to be used through its
simple and user-friendly interface. Ergonomically, the
interaction happens primarily through a symbolic
channel, which gradually teaches the user to operate
with technical terms (such as ‘low-pass’), but this hap-
pens from the habituation of the model (what we call
the epistemic tool). The predefined quality of the digital
instrument means that its functionality can be exhaus-
tively described in a user manual; all is supposed to be
explicit, nothing covert. Where the digital instrument
exhibits any chaotic or entropical behaviour, it tends to
be due to a failure in design, a bug in the code or loose
wiring in the hardware.
Let us now reverse out of the epistemologi-
cal investigations and revisit the phenomenological
point: it has been explored above how people learn
acoustic instruments through an enactive and embo-
died practice. Digital music systems or instruments
(such as Logic, Pure Data, The Hands, or the
reacTable) pose a difficulty here. They do, of course,
provide for a certain virtual embodiment, but the locus
of their real nature is fundamentally in the symbolic
realm. Although we interact in an embodied manner
with the computer using physical interfaces (moving
our mouse on a two-dimensional plane, touching
screens, or swinging Wiimotes) the interaction always
takes place through symbolic channels of varied band-
widths. The interaction is primarily with graphical
representations such as words, menus, cables or icons
on the one hand, or abstract representations such as
variables, parameters and functions on the other. This
symbolic communication is based on a designed con-
struction, which is inherently an approximation and an
ad hoc representation of the task/world/music. What
characterises the player of the digital instrument is a
mental representation of the instrument’s parameters,
and a strong awareness of how easily and arbitrarily
those can be changed. As such, the digital instrumen-
talist is always a luthier (Jorda` 2005) as well, someone
that consciously engages with the instrument as a
dynamic and fluid tool of a contingent nature.
The constraints in acoustic instruments are of a
different kind: they have naturally inbuilt affor-
dances, but those are mechanistic and physical
(typically the domain of frequency range and timbre),
not musicotheoretical and symbolic (typically the
domain of notes and form). The acoustic instrument
presents itself as a coherent whole where the interface
and the sound engine are one and the same. Although
the digital instrument can be conceived of as an
integrated whole (Bongers 2000; Jorda` 2005), this is
often done for the sake of practicality and is not
the only approach that should be taken when they are
analysed. Particularly in intelligent instruments we
find that the expressive design and the determinant of
performance experience is to be located at the sym-
bolic computational level. This area, abounding with
culture-specific models of music, has been largely
neglected in the analysis of digital musical systems.
The abstract characteristic of all system design
constitutes the epistemic nature of digital tools. The
tool is designed, its affordances and constraints are
outlined, and the user’s actions are predicted and
delineated into the instrument’s interface and inter-
action design. It is the designer who decides with clear
rational arguments what is revealed and what is
concealed in the use of the system. Whereas the body
of the acoustic instrument is physical, the body of the
digital musical instrument is intrinsically theoretical.
Skill acquisition, the path to mastery, and the nature
of virtuosity are all features that are transformed with
the digital musical instrument. From this perspective,
when computers are seen as mediation, the role of the
system designer is that of outlining a system that
directs the energy from the physical interface to the
work (or the terminus – the music) through the
symbolic engine of the epistemic tool. This activity of
blackboxing, of creating abstractions of activities
where bodily movements and thoughts are repre-
sented as discrete chunks in time, grounds the com-
plexity and the non-transparency of digital tools.
Therefore, if there is a normative message in this
paper, it would be an encouragement to acknowledge
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the theoretical, cultural and social context in which
all tools are designed – and this implies an awareness
by designers of the responsibilities they have in terms
of aesthetic and cultural influence.
7. CONCLUSION
The journey from the phenomenology to the episte-
mology of musical instruments took the following
form in this paper: first it introduced Ihde’s pheno-
menological modalities of tools. It was proposed that
we could define, with some rough generalisations,
the acoustic instrument as a channel for embodiment
relation with the world, and the digital instrument as
medium for a hermeneutic relation. Through the
analysis of enactivism, the highly embodied nature of
skill acquisition and performance of acoustic instru-
ments was identified, but that thread was abruptly
deferred in order to introduce the epistemological
fundament of designed artefacts. An exploration of
the extended mind helped to clarify how things
external to the body can become part of its cognitive
mechanism, thus rendering technology as integral
element in musical creativity. The thread of embodi-
ment was picked up again by exploring the different
phenomenological relationship we have with acoustic
and digital instruments, due to the distinct nature of
their interfaces, and this divergence was described
with regards to the conceptual and system design
complexity integral to all digital systems.
Consequently, the digital instrument was defined
as an epistemic tool (a conveyor of knowledge used by
an extended mind) and its symbolic nature was
described as a designed artefact that affords cognitive
offloading by the thinker or the performer. Although
acoustic instruments may contain epistemic dimen-
sions as well, a diverging factor in acoustic and digital
instruments is the difference in mapping between a
gesture that affects real vibrating material, on the one
hand, and an action that is arbitrarily mapped to a
symbolic system, on the other. I pointed at a funda-
mental difference of the acoustic versus the digital in
that, although both inhere knowledge of acoustics,
the latter is typically designed from the top-down
activity of classifications (of sounds, gestures and
musical patterns), where nothing is given for free by
nature. The digital instrument is an artefact primarily
based on rational foundations, and, as a tool yield-
ing hermeneutic relations, it is characterised by its
origins in a specific culture. This portrayal highlights
the strengthened responsibilities on the designers
of digital tools, in terms of aesthetics and cultural
influence, as they are more symbolic and of com-
positional pertinence than our physical tools.
This paper has focused on differences at the cost of
similarities, and divided into distinct groups phe-
nomena that are best placed on a continuum. This
has been done, not in order to claim preference for
one type or the other, but for the sake of creating an
awareness, as creators and users of instruments, of
how much intelligence our instruments contain; from
where this knowledge derives, and at what level it
resides. The project of exploring music technologies
in this manner thus becomes a truly philosophical,
aesthetic and ergonomic investigation that can ben-
efit from the use of a historical genealogy (as pro-
posed by Nietzsche and practised by Foucault) as
method. The question ‘why does a particular music
sound like it does?’ can this way be transposed into a
questioning of the conditions in which musicians
make music, which instruments are used, and the
complex origins of those. When music making has
become a process largely taking place through digital
tools, we should bear in mind that software has
agency and necessarily inheres more cultural specifi-
cations than any acoustic instrument.
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